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ABSTRACT
This paper reports estimates of labor and total factor
productivity, for thirteen manufacturing industries in the Northeast
over the period from 1820 to 1860. It finds that although the highly
mechanized and capital—intensive industries, such as cotton and wool
textiles, realized somewhat more rapid progress than the others did, even
the latter managed major advances. The evidenceappears to support the
conclusion that the manufacturing sector in the Northeast was quite
dynamic during this stage of industrialization, and that much of its
early productivity growth can be explained by changes in production
processes that did not require mechanization or substantial increases
in capital intensity. This suggests, as has been arguedby a number of
recent studies building on an old tradition, that developments such as
increases in the division and intensity of labor within firms and other
relatively subtle alterations in technique, perhaps stimulated by the
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(213) 825—4249It has long been recognized that industrialization got under
way in the U. S. early in the nineteenth century, and was largely
concentrated in the Northeast throughout the antebellum period. The
dramatic sectoral reallocation of reBources that accompanied this
process is generally acknowledged to have yielded a significant gain in
measured per capita income, if only because resources in that region
were more productive in industries other than agriculture. The extent
of productivity growth within sectors, however, remains unclear. This
gap in our knowledge has been a serious obstacle to improving
our understanding of this initial phase of industrialization, because
the record of productivity is so closely related to issues of thesources,
location, timing, and nature of this episode in American economic
growth.
Evidence on the progress realized in manufacturing, in
particular, would have a direct bearing on whether the surge of rapid
industrial expansion in the Northeast was driven by dynamic manufacturing
industries that were generating sustained increases in productivity and
income, or by a declining agricultural sector that was finding it
increasingly difficult to compete with producers outside the region.
Moreover, industry—specific estimates would help determine to what
degree early productivity growth in manufacturing was linked to capital
deepening or capital—augmenting innovations. Some scholars have
suggested that these factors were virtual prerequisites for major gains2
in productivity, while others have emphasized that changes in the
organization of labor, increases in the intensity of work, and other
alterations in production processes that were not dependent on
additional capital equipment per unit of labor may have been important
sources of measured advances (Chandler, 1977; David, 1975; Landes, 1969, 1985;
Lazonick and Brush, 1985; Marglin, 1974; Sokoloff, 1984b).
Despite the clear significance of the issues involved, there
have been few studies of productivity growth during early U. S.
industrialization due to the relative inaccessibility of evidence.'
Recently—collected samples of firm data from the schedules of the 1820
Census of Manufactures and the McLane Report of 1832 provide valuable
new sources of information however (Sokoloff, 1982). Employing these
bodies of evidence in conjunction with the Bateman—Weiss samples of
firms from the schedules of both the 1850 and the 1860 Census of
Manufactures, and the aggregate data from those censuses, this paper
seeks to establish the record of productivity growth in northeastern
manufacturing during this critical period of industrial development.
These sources are not without flaws, but the richness of the
information they contain make them together an unequalled collection of
material for research on the subject. All of them provide reports of
the value of outputs produced and the quantity or value of inputs
utilized, and thus indexes of productivity can be estimated for many
industries in each of the four years. Perhaps the primary concern
involving the quality of the data, is that the firms included in the
four cross—sectional samples from the manufacturing survey and censuses3
may not be representative of the population of northeastern
manufacturing firms during the respective years.2 Problems of the
representativeness of data are always a serious matter and require
special care in conducting the analysis. Nevertheless, as will be
discussed below, the sample selection biases that afflict these bodies
of evidence seem unlikely to be responsible for the qualitative results
uncovered.
This paper reports estimates of labor and total factor
productivity, for thirteen manufacturing industries in the Northeast
over the period from 1820 to 1860. It finds that although the highly
mechanized and capital—intensive industries, such as cotton and wool
textiles, realized somewhat more rapid progress than the others did, even
the latter managed major advances. The evidenceappears to support the
conclusion that the manufacturing sector in the Northeast was quite
dynamic during this stage of industrialization, and that much of its
early productivity growth can be explained by changes in production
processes that did not require mechanization or substantial increases
in capital intensity. This suggests, as has been argued by a number of
recent studies building on an old tradition, that developments such as
increases in the division and intensity of labor vithin firms and other
relatively subtle alterations in technique, perhaps stimulated by the
expansion of markets, may have played important roles in accounting for
the progress achieved.
Estimates of labor productivity over the period are
presented in section II of the paper. The procedures employed in4
constructing them are discussed in somedetail,andalthoughthey were
consciously designed to yield conservative estimates of the increase in
productivity, weighted averages indicate rates of labor productivity
growth that are quite high by nineteenth— or twentieth—century
standards. There is evidence of an acceleration in the pace of
advance, particularly in the less machanized and capital—intensive
industries. Estimates of total factor productivity arepresentedin
section III. They reveal that if one treats firmvaluationsof their
capital investments as relatively accurate assessments of the capital
input, as it is contended here that one should, the data imply that
most manufacturing industries realized large gains in total factor
productivity over the period. As all classes of industries appear to
have manifested similar rates of progress, doubts about the primacy of
capital deepening or capital intensity in generating productivity
growth are reinforced. Moreover, the estimated advances areofsuch a
magnitude that they appear to account, together with increases in the
ratio of raw materials to labor, for nearly allofthe rise in labor
productivity. Some general remarks on what these findings suggest
imply aboutthe early stages of industrialization in the U. S. are
offered in section IV.S
II
There are at least several reasons why the record of labor
productivity deserves separate treatment from that of total factor
productivity. Perhaps the major one iB that movements in labor
productivity convey information about the evolution of production methods
that is not generally contained in the more comprehensivemeasure.
Since several of the most important issues relating to the development
of manufacturing technology during early industrializationconcern the
direction and extent of changes in factor proportions, it wouldseem
desirable to examine both labor and total factor productivity. The
availability of the two series is also useful in that investigation of
apparent inconsistencies between them can help to identify problems
with the data or of interpretation. Finally, it might be argued that
because movements in output per unit of labor are more closely related
to those in per capita income, establishing the record of labor
productivity, even in only this single sector of the economy, would by
itself directly contribute to our understanding of economic growth
during this critical period. The accounting exercise of decomposing
the responsibility for increases in labor productivity between changes
in factor proportions and total factor productivity, for example,may
yield results suggestive of what similar calculations for per capita
income would indicate.
Two measures of labor productivity are employed here, value added
per equivalent worker and gross output per equivalent worker.6
Estimates expressed in current dollars are presented in Tables 1 4ad 2,
respectively, for thirteen industries at the years 1820, 1832,1850,
and 1860. The industries examined were selected so as to cover both
the major ones of the period and a broad cross—section of the
manufacturing sector, subject to the limitations imposed by the need
for each industry to be reasonably well represented in the samples of
manufacturing firm data and a desire to maintain conventional
industrial classifications.3 Some industries do not have estimates of
productivity reported f or certain years, because of an inadequate
number of observations, but the threshold for inclusion was set to keep
the number of omissions low.
Three sets of estimates, ,, and arereported
for each industry. They are computed over different subsets of firma,
with the variation in composition attributable to the progressive
application of increasingly stringent standards for separating
establishments likely to be operating part—time from those in full—time
production. Part—time enterprises should be excluded from the sub—
samples over which the estimates are prepared, because the measured
productivity levels of such firms are biased downward due to the
general practice of reporting the average labor input over the period
in operation, rather than over the entire year.4 Since these firms
generally failed to explicitly identify themselves, several methods of
ordering the establishments by their probability of being part—time
operators, so that selected proportions could be dropped from the sub—
samples over which productivity was estimated, were applied to theTABLE 1
Noninsi ValueAdded per Equivalent Worker in
Selected Manufacturing Industries: 1820 to 1860
Boots! Shoes
7

































































































































































































































































































































Notes Sources: The firm—level estimates were computed from the
samples of northeastern manufacturing firm data drawn from tbe
schedules of the 1820, 1850) and 1860 Federal Censuses of Manufactures
and the McLane Report (U. S. Rouse of Representatives, 1832). The
aggregate estimates were computed from the industry—wide information
reported by state in V. S. Census Office (1858, 1865). The figures
reported for 1832, 1850, and 1860 are based on information that
probably pertains primarily to the operations of firms in 1831, 1849,
and 1859 respectively. The estimates were calculated as the ratio of
the industry value added (or the value of output minus the cost of the
raw materials) to the total number of equivalent adult male workers in
the industry. The number of equivalent workers was computed according
to the formulation: TE 11 +0.5(F +B)+B,where TE is the number
of equivalent adult male workers, M is the number of adult male
employees, F and B are the numbers of female and boy employees
respectively, and B is set equal to one per firm as the measure of the
entrepreneurial input. In 1850 and 1860, firms generally did not
separately enumerate adult males and boys. Accordingly, the reported
numbers of male employees in those years were decomposed into adults
and boys by assuming that boys accounted for the same proportions, by
industry, of male employees as tbey had in 1820. In those industries
in which boys had accounted for more than 33 percent of male employees
in 1820, it was further assumed that the shares had been reduced to 339
percent by 1850 and 1860.
The estimates based on firmdatawere computed over sub—samples
from the various years that have observations deleted from them in
order to control for the effects of establishments that operated only
part—time and other outliers. The method adopted to identify potential
part—time firms utilized tvo distributions of firmsforeach year by total
factor productivity, one computed with gross output as the measure of
output (TFP) and the other treating value added as that measure (NFP). The
guiding principle was that the lower the total factor productivity of a
firmina given year, the more likely the firm was a part—time
operation and should be truncated from the sub—sample of establishments
over 'which the productivity estimates were computed.
Three sets of productivity estimates have been prepared from
three corresponding sets of firmsub—samples.The sets of sub—samples
vary in composition by the successive truncations made primarily to
exclude part—time firmsfrom thecalculations. The 4setof
estimates were computed over sub—samples of firms 'with no adjustments
for part—time operators. •The establishments dropped from the samples
of firms that reported all of the necessary information and did not
explicitly identify themselves as part—time enterprises to obtain the ,4
sub—samplesincluded those with negative value added, a few other large
outliers, and those who placed in the top 3 percent of enterprises in
the respective years by both measures of total factor productivity.
These criteria led to 4 percent being truncated from the 1820 sample, 3
percent from that in 1832, 5 percent in 1850, and 4 percent from the10
sample in 1860.
SetB is based on more severe truncations of the left—tails
of the distributions of firms by total factor productivity. For the
1820 sub—sample, establishments that ranked in the lowest 30 percent by both
measures of total factor productivity were dropped from sub—sample ,
toget .Thecorresponding percentages were 5 percent in 1832, 10
percent in 1850, and 10 percent in 1860. The smaller proportions
truncated from the samples of later years reflect the presumed decline
over time in the fraction of firma operating part—time, as well as the
desire to bias the estimated productivity growth rate downward. In
order to achieve this latter goal, one would seek to overestimate the
proportion of establishments in 1820 that operated part—time, and
underestimate the proportion in 1860.Aparticularly small proportion
was dropped from the 1832 sample because enumerators from the NcLane
Report indicated that nearly all of the establishments covered from the
states considered here were operating throughout the year. The total
proportions of firms excluded from the entire samples to obtain set I
were29 percent in 1820, 5 percent in 1832,9percent in 1850, and 10
percent in 1860.
-
Forset ,evenlarger fractions of the firms in the samples
were truncated. Firms that, by either measure of total factor
productivity, were in the bottom 40 percent of the 1820 sample were
left out of the sub—sample that was the basis for theestimates of
that year. The corresponding threshold points for truncation from the
sub—samples for the other years are 10 percent for 1832,20percent11
for 1850) and 20 percent for 1860. In addition, those establishments
that were in the top 3 percent of firms by either measure of total
factor productivity in their respective years, and had not already been
dropped from theand.sub—samples,were also truncated to produce
the £sub—samples.These criteria led to 48 percent being truncated
from the 1820 sample, 17 percent from that of 1832, 28 percent from
that of 1850, and 29 percent from that of 1860.
Thenumbers appearing within parentheses signify the number
of observations on which the respective estimate is based. No
estimates are reported for years in which there were less than three
observations in the j sub—sample. The only industry whose estimates are
based on such a limited number of firmsisglass, but in this case the
several firms appearing in the 1820 sample account for a substantial
proportion of the regional output. No estimates are reported for the
boots/shoes industry in 1832, because a large proportion of the firms
inthe sample fromthatyear were putting—out establishments.TABLE 2
Noina1 GrossOutput per EquivaleDt Worker iu
Selected MatufscturiDg Industries: 1820 to 1860
1820 1832 1850 1850 1860 1860
(fix-si.) (egg.) (ursa) (egg.)
Boots! A $517.6 (22) $556.8 (254) $904.2 (170)
Shoes B 581.2 (17) 564.1 (247) $563.0 (8110) 910.1 (161) $803.6 (7326)
C 594.6 (15) 593.7 (207) 940.7 (133)
Coachesl A873.8 (33)$574.4 (36)765.9 (96) 1175.8 (122)
EarnessesB 904.6 (31)614.0 (35) 902.4(88) 763.4 (2635) 1184.2 (118) 987.5 (5057)
C928.1 (28)622.1 (32)932.3 (77) 1136.4 (98)
Cotton A 668.4 (64) 927.7 (76)1045.0 (24) 1053.2 (23)
Textile. B 721.6 (45) 928.6 (75)1056.6 (23)1073.7 (856) 1053.2 (23) 1497.0 (840)
C 796.7 (25) 933.7(69)1046.3 (18) 1574.0 (20)
Furiture/ A 629.2 (25)677.3 (26)724.4 (48) 1023.8 (42)
Woodwork B 665.1 (21)685.8 (25)742.3 (46)830.9 (2299) 1064.0 (38)1027.4 (1804)
C 760.5 (15)721.0 (22)762.5 (39) 1096.5 (31)
Glass A 676.0 (3) 1300.4 (6)
B676.0 (3)1300.4 (6) 879.4 (77) 1030.5 (79)
C 727.2 (2)1299.6 (5)
Eats A 796.2 (27)1027.5 (13)1329.0 (17) 1866.6 (13)
B 899.3 (22)1027.5 (13)1338.7 (16)1278.2 (814) 1866.6 (13)1605.3(281)
C816.7 (19)1061.2 (10)1377.2 (12) 1868.1 (11)
1ro A 762.2 (32) 745.2 (36) 1457.1 (23)
B 1251.4 (21) 872.2 (33)1030.5 (1494) 1588.2 (21) 1422.2 (1288)
C1347.1 (15) 881.7 (28) 1788.9 (15)
Liquors A 1554.5 (177) 1454.0 (7) 4253.9 (13)
B 1882.1 (132) 1606.0 (6)3341.0 (633) 4508.9 (12)4252.1 (922)
C 1954.0 (107) 1806.6 (4) 4898.0 (10)
Flour! A 1950.3 (70) 3895.9 (109) 5756.9 (105)
GristMills B 2540.3 (45) 4037.1 (104) 4900.8 (5128) 6117.0 (97)6154.7 (4964)
C 2650.4 (34) 4794.6 (64) 6599.5 (64)
Paper A 667.9 (23)1418.2 (27)2153.1 (20) 1619.1 (20)
3 673.3 (22)1418.2 (27)2153.1 (20)2065.8 (361) 1648.4 (19)2286.9 (472)
C 690.2 (20)1477.8 (23)1953.5 (18) 1874.9 (14)
Tanning A 853.5 (120) 1535.7 (45)1412.3 (98) 2750.5 (77)
B1037.0 (76)1550.2 (43)1455.5 (92)1909.3 (3256) 2825.1 (69) 3573.5 (2670)
C1218.7 (47)1450.2 (33)1581.8 (65) 3043.0 (53)
Tobacco A 669.0 (8) 727.2 (15) 1781.4 (12)
B 682.6 (7) 727.2 (15)715.0 (628) 1781.4 (12)1120.3(918)
C703.6 (5) 838.2 (12) 1809.8 (11)
Wool A 677.3 (53)1662.8 (59)1756.1 (42) 2086.6 (23)
TextilesB 821.3 (35)1664.8 (58)1776.7 (40)1530.8 (1375) 2086.6 (23)2143.4 (1041)
C 906.1 (19)1681.3 (48)1784.6 (35) 2120.5 (20)
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Table 2
Notes and Sources: See the note to Table 1. The estimates were
calculated as the ratio of the value of gross output to the total
number of equivalent adult male workers.14
problem, and yielded roughly similar results. The method and
procedures underlying the construction of the three setsofsub—samples
employed in this paper are explained in the note to Table 1. The logic
behind reporting three sets of estimates is to provide evidence on the
sensitivity of the results to the assumptions made about the prevalence
of part—time operators in different years.5 Although intended to yield
somewhat conservative estimates of the rates of productivity growth
over time, the 1setrepresents the "best—guess" figures, and will be
the basis, unless otherwise indicated, for the results discussed below.
The major implication of the estimates reported in Tables 1 and
2 is that nominal labor productivity, whether evaluated in terms of
value added or gross output, increased substantially between 1820 and
1860. All of the thirteen selected industries registered significant
advances in product per equivalent worker, by each of the measures. Ten
of the thirteen managed a greater than 50 percent increase in gross
output per unit of labor (GQLP) between 1820 and 1860, and eight did by
the value—added gauge of labor productivity (VLP).6 The unweighted
averages of the growth over the period in the value—added and gross—
output measures of labor productivity are 73 and 102 percent
respectively, whereas the weighted average increases are only slightly
different1 72 and 112 percent.7 This record of advance might not seem
remarkable taken by itself, but considered together with the evidence
of sharp decreases in output prices (see Table 3), the implied gains in
real labor productivity are dramatic indeed.
It is fortunate that the principal qualitative finding seems15
to be insensitive to reasonable variation in the proportions of firms
truncated from the samples to deal with the problem of the inclusion
of part—time firms in the data. Theestimates imply much more
substantial productivity growth than the "best—guess"figures, and
theset suggests somewhat less progress, but all three provide
evidence of an era of major increases in manufacturing productivity.
This general robustness can be demonstrated by computing the implied
growth in labor productivity that results from an especially extreme
adjustment for the problem.8 If, for example, one accepts the
estimates for 1820, and the Iestimatesfor 1860, thus assuming that an
unrealistically high proportion of firms in the earlier year operated
part—time and that an extraordinary decline in their prevalence
occurred, weighted averages of the estimated growth in labor
productivity over the thirteen industries fall from 72 to 46 for value—
added labor productivity and from 112 to 97 percent for gross—output
labor productivity. These are not trivial alterations to the
quantititive results, but the picture of labor productivity growth in
manufacturing that emerges from the data remains essentially unchanged.
Such sensitivity analysis suggests that although the initial truncation
of establishments for likely part—time operations has major effects on
estimated productivity levels and growth, the influence of successive
truncations declines, to the point that no plausible revision of the
proportion of firms assumed to be operating part—time in 1820 could
reverse the basic finding of major advances over the period.
There are several troubling features of the estimates that16
should be considered in interpreting them, but they do not seem to
warrant a general rejection of the reliability of the figures. Perhaps
foremost among these is the irregular pattern of advance that a number
of the industries exhibit. Nominal labor productivity does not always
increase continuously across the sub—periods, and even in those industries
where it does, the apparent rates of growth fluctuate widely over time.
Some variability should be expected, however, since the nominal
estimates are not adjusted for the substantial and erratic changes in
the prices of many commodities, including outputs and raw materials,
that occurred during the period. Moreover, a great deal of random
variation in the estimates of productivity would also be generated by
the limited numbers of observations.9 This latter problem is quite
serious for estimating the growth in productivity over the sub—periods,
but would be expected to decline in significance for the study of long—
term changes, because the proportion of the variation in estimated
productivity due to substantive or actual movements in productivity
should increase with the length of the period under examination.
Also puzzling are the sometimes large discrepancies between the
estimates computed from the firm—level information and those from
aggregate data in 1850 and 1860. The industry estimates drawn from
these two sources are frequently similar, but diverge substantially in
some cases, particularly in 1850. One might have expected the
figures based on aggregate data to be generally lower, because of the
presumed inclusion of part—time establishments in those totals.
However, where there are large disparities, it is typically these17
estimates which exceed those from the firm data. This mightteem to
imply that the prevalence, or the production, of part—timeoperators
was rather modest in those years. In addition, the pattern is
consistent with the view that the design of the 1850 and 1860samples
served to significantly bias the productivity estimates for those
years downward.10 Accordingly, one might suppose that theaggregate-.
based estimates would be more representative of the actualproductivity
levels in the respective industries than thosecomputed from firm data.
Whatever the reasons for the discrepancies, the closecorrespondence
between the estimates iii 1860 means that the qualitativeresults on
productivity growth over the entire period are not sensitive to the
choice between the firm— and aggregate—bated figures forthat year.
Although the series of current—dollar estimates are useful in
roughly gauging the long—term trends inlaborproductivity, they are
not nearly as informative as would be series expressed inconstant dollars.
Accordingly, a variety of price indexes have been assembled to
construct estimates of real productivity from current—dollar values,
and are reported in Table 3. Measures of thechanges in the prices of
the outputs and of the raw materials for each of the thirteen
industries would of course be preferred for the calculationof the
constant—dollar estimates. This goal could not be achieved, buta wide—
ranging survey of available price series for the period yielded
industry—specific indexes for the outputs of all thirteen industries,
and for the raw materials of nine." The Warren andPearson Price
Index (henceforth referred to as the WPI)was employed as the index forTA3LE 3 18
PriceIndexes, 1820 to 1860
1820 1832 1850 1860
General Output Price Indexes
Consumer Price Index 156 119 93 100
Wholesale Price Index 114 99 88 102
IduEtryPriceIndexes
Boots/Shoes Q 166 155 111 100
RH 113 124 88 113
XL 140 135 103 105
Coaches/ Q 178 141 95 100
Rarnesses RH 137 119 106 102
XL 150 128 109 102
Cotton Q 179 115 78 98
Textiles RH 155 88 69 110
XL 160 130 112 103
7urniture/ Q 200 149 111 100
Woodwork RH 111 102 121 98
XL 151 126 115 100
Glass Q 190 109 81 100
RH 114 99 88 102
XL 149 115 99 101
Rats Q 166 155 111 105
RH 114 99 88 102
XL 142 127 105 103
Iron Q 171 145 113 100
RN 128 111 99 102
XL 159 137 118 103
Liquors Q 96 91 104
RH 57 83 96
XL 124 106 102
Plour/ Q 91 87 98
Grist Mills RH 57 83 96
XL 142 115 102
Paper Q 319 244 125 104
RH 179 115 78 98
XL 164 136 111 101
Tanning Q 90 99 70 113
RH 65 72 51 113
XL 104 101 81 108
Tobacco Q 138 69 100 127
RN 138 69 100 127
XL 140 81 103 122
Wool Q 161 138 133 102
Textiles 95 74 80 104
XL 144 124 114 102
Capital CopooentPriceIndexes
Machinery 183 159 138 107
Structures 136 118 107 10019
Table 3
Notes Sources: Corresponding to the productivity estimates, the
price indexes reported for 1832, 1850, and 1860 actually refer to the
price levels in 1831, 1849, and 1859. The price indexes, however, are
expressed relative to an 1860 standard of 100. The industry—specific
capital price indexes were constructed as a weighted average of the
price indexes for "structures" and "machinery", as well as of the
industry—specific indexes for output and raw materials. The weights
were obtained from firm level data on the composition of the total
capital investment contained in the McLane Renprt or, when there were
insufficient observations from 1832, from aggregate information
containedin the report of the 1890 Census of Manufactures. See
Sokoloff (1984a) and U. S Census Office (1895). The "structures" and
"machinery" indexes were weighted by the shares of the total capital
investment that they accounted for in the respective industries. The
remaining proportion of the capital investment was assumedtoconsist
entirely of inventories, which were divided equally between output and
raw materials. Bence, the latter two indexes received half of the
weight for inventories in constructing each industry. capital price
series.
General Output: Consumer and Wholesale Price Indexes (CPI and
WPI henceforth) from U. S. Bureau of the Census (1975, E—135 and
E—52).20
Boots/Shoes: Output price index for "shoes" from Brady (1966).
Interpolation was based on the WPI (as were all interpolations
of price indexes drawn from Brady). The index for raw materials
was constructed from the 1850 and 1860 firm data, and from
U. S. Bureau of the Census (1975, £—55).
Coaches/Harnesses: Output index constructed from that for
"carriages, buggies, and wagons" in Brady (1966), and from the
1850 and 1860 firm data. The index for raw materials also
consists of a segment obtained from these data, spliced into the
WP I.
Cotton Textiles: Both the output and raw materials indexes are
from U. S. Bureau of the Census (1975, E—128 and E—126).
Furniture/Woodwork: The output index is that for "furniture"
from Brady (1966), and the raw materials index is from U. S. Bureau
of the Census (1975, E—59), and the 1850 and 1860 firm data.
Class: The output index is that for "window glass" from
Brady (1964). The WPI serves as the index for raw materials.
Rate:Theoutput index is that for "mens hats" from Brady
(1964) The WPI serves as the index for raw materials.21
Iron: The output index was constructed from several price
series contained in Cole (1938). The raw materials index is the
WPI, with a segment estimated from the 1850 and 1860 firm data
spliced in.
Liquors: Both indexes are from U. S. Bureau of the Census
(1975, E—62 and E—123).
Mills: Both indexes are from U. S. Bureau of the Census (1975,
E—124 and E—123).
Paper: The output price index is that for "writing paper" from
Brady (1966). The index for raw materials is from U. S. Bureau
of the Census (1975, E—128).
Tanning: The same price index serves here as the basis for both
the output and raw materials indexes, U. S. Bureau of the Census
(1975, E—55). The two indexes differ slightly, however, in that
the segments between 1850 and 1860 were obtained from the firm
data for those years.
Tobacco: A price index for "tobacco" was constructed from
several series appearing in Cole (1938). This index was
utilized for both outputs and raw materials.22
Wool. Textiles: The output index is for "woolen worsted goods"
from Brady (1%6). The index for raw materials wasconstructed
from information in Cole (1938).
Capital Component Price Indexes: The indexes for structures and
machineryarefor "factories, office buildings" and "machine—
shop products" respectively. Both are drawn from Brady (1966).23
the prices of raw materials in the remaining four industries. In cases
where there was reason to doubt the representativeneas of an index, and
where the procedure was feasible, the change in price between 1850 and
1860wasestimated from the information in the samples fromthose
years, and patched into the original series.12
In addition to these price indexes for outputs andraw
materials, Table 3 also presents industry—specific estimates of the
price of capital. These indexes of the price of capital will be
utilized in the calculations of total factor productivity treated
below, and were computed as weighted averages of the indexes for
structures, machinery, outputs, andrawmaterials. The weights vary
across industries, and were obtained from industry—specific proportions
of capital invested in structures and laud, machinery and tools, and
inventories. Inventories were assumed to have been composed of equal
amounts of outputs and of raw materials.
Perhaps the most striking general pattern that emerges from an
examination of Table 3 is that the prices of outputs declined
significantly relative to those of raw materials and capital between
1820 and 1860. In all of the thirteen industries but tobacco, where
the same series was adopted for both outputs and raw materials, the
index for output prices fell relative to that for raw materials; the
index declined relative to that for capital in ten of the thirteen.
Since it is also clear that real wages rose substantiallyover the
period, one can infer, by duality, that total factor productivity must
have increased (Sokoloff, 1983).24
Indexes of real value added and real gross output per equivalent
worker have been constructed for the thirteen industries by applying
the output price series to the conversion of the current—dollar labor
productivity estimates to units of constant dollars. These indexes,
which are presented in Tables 4 and 5 respectively, indicate that all
of the industries realized major advances in real labor productivity,
by either measure, between 1820 and 1860. Weighted averages of the
records of the industries yield, taking the estimates based on aggregate
data as the standard for 1860, increases of 166 percent in value added
per equivalent worker and 198 percent by the alternative gauge. Only
very few failed to register gains of 100 percent. It is interesting to
note that in most industries the progress in gross output per
equivalent worker significantly exceeded that in value added per
equivalent worker. This feature of the results preawnably reflects a
rapid growth in the amounts of raw materials processed per unit of
labor during the period.
As for the reliability of these labor productivity estimates,
it must be admitted that even after their conversion to constant
dollars, there remain many anomalies where the productivity growth
indicated f or an industry over a sub—period is either implausibly high
or low. These cases generally involve rather short span. of time, but
not always. Many of them might be attributed to noise in the point
estimates generated by a paucity of observations, inappropriate or
inaccurate price indexes, rapid changes in the factor proportions
utilized, varying degrees or types of sample selection bias overtheTABLE 4 25
Index of Real Value Added Per Equivalent Worker
in Selected Manufacturing Industries: 1820 to 1860
















































































































































































































































































































Notes and Sources: See the notes to Tables 1 and 3. The estimates of
value added per equivalent worker presented in Table 1 were converted
to constant dollars by employing the price indexes reported in Table 3,
and then normalized relative to a base of 100 representing the
respective industrys level in 1820. The weights employed in computing
the weighted averages are equivalent to the industry shares of the value
added produced in the northeastern states in 1850, and were calculated
from information contained in U. S. Census Office (1858). The weights
were normalized so that their si was equal to one whenever there were
missing values. Averages based on fewer than thirteen industries
(affected by missing values) are reported within brackets.27 TABLE5
Index of Real Gross Output per Equivileut Worker
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Notes and Sources: See the notes to Tables 2 and 3. The estimates of
gross output per equivalent worker in current dollars presented in
Table 2 were converted to constant dollars by employing the price
indeies reported in Table 3) and then normalized relative to a base of
100 representing the respective industry's level in 1820. The weights
employed in computing the weighted averages are equivalent to the
industry shares of gross output produced in the northeastern states in
1850) and were calculated from information contained in U. S. Census
Office (1858). The weights were normalized so that their si was equal
to one whenever there were missing values. Average. based on fewer
than thirteen industries (affected by missing values) are reported
within brackets.29
years included, or cyclical effects, but their number is nevertheless
unsettling. It is, however, reassuring to Dote that the frequency and
magnitude of Buch strange results are greatly reduced in the series of
total factor productivity estimates discussed below.'3 The industry
with the most puzzling record is paper, which appears, by both measures
of labor productivity, to have realized astonishingly high rates of
advance, particularly after 1832. Although substantial progress would
be expected, because of the dramatic increases in the utilization of
raw materials and capital per unit of labor over the period, the
estimated gains are probably too large to be believed. Given that this
qualitative result is not sensitive to the choice between the firm—
level and aggregate estimates, the problem may stem from the output
price index employed.14 Anomalies in the productivity series for
boots/shoes, tanning, and tobacco are also associated with suspicious
movements it the relevant price indexes.'5
The per annum growth rates of labor productivity presented in
Table 6 were computed from the ..setsof indexes in Table 4 and 5.
Rates of advance are reported for the entire period from 1820 to 1860,
as well asforseveral sub—periods. The estimates indicate that labor
productivity increased rapidly in virtually all industries, ranging
from 1.0 and 2.1 percent per annum for VLPandGQLPrespectivelyin
flour/grist mills to 4.3—5.5 and 5.3—6.2 percent in paper. Weighted
averages of the performance of the thirteen industries yield estimated
ranges of 2.0—2.4 percent and 2.5—2.7 percent for the rates of growth
of the two meaarcc zflaborproductivity. These figures areTABLE 6
GrowthRates of Labor Productivity
in Selected Manufacturing Industries: 1820 to 1860
30
1820—1832 1820—1850 1850—1860 1820—1860






















































































































































Notes j4Sources:Theseannualrates of growth were computed from the
constant—dollar estiistes of labor productivity presented inset "B" of
Tables 4 and 5. The VU' estimates refer to thegrowth of value added
per equivalent worker, and the GQLP refer to the growth ofgross output
per equivalent worker. Range. of estimate. are oftenpresented,
reflecting the differences between the figurea derived from firmdata
and those based on aggregate data. See thenotes to Tables 4 and 5.32
remarkable in that they are drawn from the experience of industries
that together accounted for a large share of the entire manufacturing
sector in the Northeast, and yet are substantially higher than those
that other scholars concerned with antebellum growth have calculated
for the U. S. economy as a whole. (David, 1967, 1977; Gailman, 1972a,
1972b).
Not only do these estimates of productivity growth in
northeastern manufacturing during early industrialization exceed what
might have been expected from previous work, but they are quite high by
historical standards. For example, NcCloskey (1981) has computed rates
of labor productivity growth for four major manufacturing industries in
Britain during that country's initial phase of industrial development,
1780 to 1860. His industry rates range from 0.9 to 2.6 percent per
annum, with an unweighted average of 1.6 percent. Moreover,the
figures presented here are greater than those estimated by Kendrick
(1961) for the U. S. manufacturing sector between 1869 and 1957.
The other major pattern that emerges from these estimated rates
of labor productivity growth is that, on average, there appears to have
been an acceleration in the pace of advance over the period. This
characterization is based primarily on a comparison of the record
between 1820 and 1850 with that between 1850 and 1860,andthus must be
offered tentatively. An analysis focusing on the performance before
and after 1832, of the eight industries for which we have estimates in
that year, yields weak, if any, evidence of acceleration.
Nevertheless, the thirteen industries considered together exhibit a33
marked increase in the rate of labor productivity growth. The
acceleration is particularly striking with the VLPmeasure, where a
weighted average of the industries registered growth of 1.6—2.1percent
per annun before 1850 and 3.3 percent following. On an individual
industry basis, nine of the thirteen realized faster growthduring the
later sub—period than in the earlier one.Although, the pace of
advance may indeed have quickened, it is clear thatrapid progress must
have been realized as early as the 1820o. While the evidenceof
acceleration in productivity during the initialstages of
industrialization might seem to conform well with the work ofscholars
who view the diffusion of mechanization across themanufacturing sector
during the 1840s and 1850s as the crucial development behind
productivity growth in manufacturing, this perspective contributes little
to understanding how and why the impressive advances between 1820
and 1850 were achieved (Chandler, 1977).
Given that the utilization of sophisticated machinery and
highly capital—intensive production processes were essentially confined
to but a few induBtries until late in the period, the finding thata
broad range of manufacturing industries enjoyed substantialgains in
productivity throughout the early nineteenth century might tend to enhance
appreciation of the importance of the changes in labor organization and
other relatively modest alterations in technique thatseem to have
generally been adopted sooner and more widely. Another reaction, however,
would be to question the accuracy of the estimates ofproductivity
growth. Comparisons between the rates reported here and those computed34
for other places or eras do provide some check on the plausibility of
the re8ultS, but those drawn with alternative industry—specific figures
for the same period would be even more informative. Unfortunately,
such estimates are quite scarce, and the only prominent industry for
which they are readily available is cotton textiles. As for that
industry, the rates of labor productivity growth presented here are
generally lower than what other scholars have found. Davis and
Stettler (1966) calculated that gross output per worker in the entire
U. S. industry increased at rates of 4.1 percent per annum between
1820 and 1860, and of 3.4 percent between 1832 and 1860, as compared to
the 2.5—3.5 and 1.9—2.3 rates for the respective periods reported here.
Their estimates for cotton textiles in Massachusetts indicate somewhat
slower rates of advance in that state; but their figure of 2.2 percent
per annum growth between 1832 and 1860, resembling the 2.0 and 2.5
rates of McGouldrick (1968) and Layer (1955) for mills in Lowell during
roughly the same years, is near the upper end of our range. Nickless's
(1979) analysis of Layer's data on three Lowell establishments yields
an even higher estimate, 33 percent per annum, for the period from
1836 to 1860. Bence, the evidence from the only other industry for
which independent estimates are easily obtained suggests that our
figures on labor productivity growth are on the low side, as they were
constructed to be.
A skeptic might not accept the number or relevance of the
standards of comparison utilized, and continue to dispute the estimatea
of the rates of advances as too high, claiming that the results were an35
artifact due to some defect in the data or in the way they were
derived. There are, indeed, several aspects of the estimation
procedure that could potentially be of sufficient import to account for
the findings of rapid productivity growth across a wide spectrum of
manufacturing industries, and on average, in the sector at large.
Perhaps the most obvious of these is the selection of price indexes.
As is clear from the indexes listed in Table 3, there were substantial
fluctuations in both absolute and relative prices over the period from
1820to1860.Inthis context, it is conceivable that some of the
price indexes utilized might diverge significantly from the actual
movement of the relevant prices, particularly since the indexes
frequently pertain to only one specific product or rawmaterialof an
industry and were in several cases drawn from the WPI. Nevertheless, in
order for there to be a qualitatively—important upward bias in the
estimates of productivity growth, the respective price indexes would
have to seriously overstate the decline in output prices relative to
input prices. Given the absence of any evidence or argument that such
a systematic pattern in the errors of the price indexes across
industries exists, there would seem to be no basis for accepting the
argument that inaccurate price indexes account for the general finding
of rapid labor productivity growth.
There are several other reasons to doubt the severity of the
problems with the price indexes. The first is that when multiple price
indexes were available for an industry, the most conservative of them
were generally selected for use, so as to bias the estimated rates of36
productivity groth downward. Another factor that mitigates the
significance of possible errors in the indexes is that the value—added
figures were deflated to constant dollars with only output price
indexes, instead of converting the values of gross outputs and raw
materials separately. In manufacturing industries in which the prices
of the raw materials consuxned fell relative to the output prices, this
procedure would lead the advance over time in real labor productivity
to be overestimated. The evidence, however, auggests that it was the
relative price of the outputs that typically declined during the
period. Of the eight industries included in Table 3 that have separate
and industry—specific indexes for outputs and inputs, all experienced a
decrease in the former relative to the latter. To the extent that
this pattern was characteristic of the manufacturing sector, the
eriployment of output price series to deflate the nominal value—added
figures should tend to bias estimates of productivity growth downward,
not upward. Hence, the likelihood that the result of substantial
advances was due to inaccurate price indexes seems even more remote.
Given that there are undoubtedly some errors in the price indexes
utilized, however, and that the magnitude and perhaps the direction, of
the biases referred to must vary across industries, one should be
cautious about comparing the relative performances reported for
individual industries. Although the rates of productivity growth
should be biased downward in most industries, the variability
in the extent of the biases at the industry level implies that the
record of any particular industry relative to another might be quite37
fragile.16
The other feature of the construction of the estimates that the
qualitative results might plausibly be sets itive to is the method of
adjuatnient for the inclusion of establishments Operating part—time in
the samples. This is a potentially important problem, because such
enterprises did not generally explicitly identify themselves as such,
became less prevalent in manufacturing over time, and had their
measures of productivity biased downward fromtheactual levels,17 As
discussed above, the logic of the procedure adopted to deal with the
di1emii.a was based on the assumption that the lower the total factor
productivity of an establishment, the greater the likelihood it
operated only a fraction of the year. Generous assessments of the
prevalance of part—time operations in the various years were made, and
corresponding percentages of the least productive enterprises were
dropped from the respective samples to obtain the sub—samples over
which the sets of estimates were computed. Theset of estimates was
intended to represent conservative "best—guess" figures, and provides the
basis for the rates of growth reported in Table 6. If the adjustments
to the samplesunderestimatedthe extent of part—time operations in
1820, or especially the decrease in their prevalence overtime,then
the rates of productivity growth would likely be biased upward. This is
conceivably a possibility, but as an examination of the nominal figures
in Table I and 2 indicates, the qualitative result of rapid
productivity growth, on average, in manufacturing is not sensitive to
reasonable variation in the proportions of firms presumed to have beet38
operating part—time and truncated from the samples. Estimates of
the advances in several of the industries, such as iron and tanning,
might be substantially affected, however, as could the relative rates of
progress in sons industries versus others.
There are other aspects of the estimation procedures that might
be expected to yield biased results, but they are more likely to
lead to understatements of the advances in productivity than overstatements.
The first concerns the manner in which value added was computed. Each
of the bodies of data employed contains reports of the value of outputs
produced and the value of raw materials consumed by the particular firm
of industry. Value added was calculated in a straightforward fashion
by deducting the value of the rawmaterialsfrom the total value of
output. The potential bias arises from the additional category of
expenses specified by firms in the 1820 Census of Manufactures. This
class of production coats was defined as "contingent expenses" and
included the costs of itemssuchas fuel, insurance, and repairs to
equipment. Since none of the other surveys collected information on a
similar category of expenses, "contingent expenses" were ignored in the
calculation of the value added figures for 1820. If, however, some of
tbe expenditures on inputs counted among "contingent expenses" in that
year were included as raw materials later, then the value added per
firmwouldbe overestimated in 1820 relative to that in other years,
and the growth in the value—added measures of productivity
underest imated.
Another possible source of systematic error in the preparation39
of the productivity estimates is the method of aggregating different
classes of workers into units of adult—male equivalents. Females and
boys have been treated as equal, in terms of their labor input, to one—
half of an adult—male employee, with these weights having been drawn
from evidence on the relative wages of the groups prevailing near the
end of the period.18 It both the 1820 Census of Manufactures and the
McLane Report of 1832, each of the three types of workers were
separately enumerated. There were only two classifications of
employees utilized in the 1850 and 1860 censuses, however, males and
females. For those years, the reported number of male workers in each
industry was decomposed into adults and boys by assuming that the
industry—specific proportions of males that were boys were the same in
1850 and 1860 as they had been in 1820.19 Since the shares of male
employees that were boys probably rose somewhat over the period, a
small upward bias might be imparted by this procedure to the estimation
of the labor inputs in the later, relative to the earlier, years
(Goldjn and Sokoloff, 1982). As a consequence, estimates of
productivity in those years, and thus of its growth aver time, would
tend to be biased downward.
One might also expect the estimates of productivity growth
during the period to understate the actual record because of the
problems in the sample selection that afflict the various bodies of
data. First, the systematic under—counting of smaller establishments
in the 1820 and 1832 samples should probably generate overestimates of
the productivity levels in those years.2° In addition, the40
unrepresentative character of the samples from 1850 and 1860wouldbe
expected to yield underestimates. These two samples were designed to
ensure that tbere were a certain minimum number of observations from
each state that had surviving data and hence suffer from a
disproportionate representation of manufacturing firms from states that
had relatively limited industrial development or small populations
(Ateck, Bateman, and Weiss, 1979). As the firms from such states
tended to be less productive than those from other areas, at least
partially because of their smaller scales of operation, the levels of
productivity estimated from the samples should be lower than those
actually prevailing in the Northeast at the respective year..
Moreover, the inclusion of part—time establishments in the aggregate
data from the 1850 and 1860 censuses means that the estimates obtained
from these sources are downward biased as well. Eence, with
productivity levels overestimated for 1820 and underestimated for 1850
and 1860, the rates of advance derived should be lower than those that
were actually realized.
The above discussion has reviewed, in considerable detail, many
of the features of the data sources and the estimation procedures that
might have contributed to inaccurate or biased assessments of the
productivity growth between 1820 and 1860. It has been argued that
most of them would be expected to have led to estimates that were
biased downward. The chief exception to this generalization about the
impacts of the potential biases is the effect of a decline over time
in the relative amount of manufacturing production carried out by firms41
operating seasonally. The disproportionate truncation of the least
productive manufacturing establishments from the 1820 sample, however,
should probably more than compensate for this problem, because the
percentages dropped from the analysis for the thirteen industries seems
likely to have exceeded those of firms that were part—time enterprises.
Even if the adjustments underlying theset of estimates, on which the
discussion focuses, are not quite sufficient, sensitivity analysis
employing setfor 1820 indicates that the qualitative results would
not be altered by any reasonable relaxation of the assumptions
concerning the prevalence of seasonal operations in that year.21
Particularly when one considers the net effect of all the biases, it
appears likely that the estimates of productivity growth in
manufacturing understates, on average,- the actual record.
The evidence seems to support the conclusion that labor
productivity growth in manufacturing during this initial phase of
industrialization was remarkably rapid and significantly higher than
scholars may have previously reckoned. What is one to make of this
performance? One possibility is to attribute the progress to the
combined effects of a variety of related developments marking the
period that include the introduction and diffusion of machinery, increases
in capital and raw materials intensity, changes in the organization of
labor, the realization of scale economies, learning—by—doing,
and the impact of expanding markets through the selecting—out of
inefficient producers and the stimulation of technical innovation. One
might also explain the remarkably high rates of labor productivity42
growth as being at least partially accounted for by the severe
contraction that occurred in the U. S. between 1816 and 1821, and might
have dragged productivity in 1820 veil below its trend level. From
this perspective, the estimates could accurately reflect the actual
amount of labor productivity growth between 1820 and 1860, but convey a
misleading impression about the long—term record.
Although cyclical effects might, in principle, have been large,
the qualitative findings with respect to productivity growth over the
entire period from 1820 to 1860 are not fundamentally altered when one
makes adjustments for them. In order to gauge the potential magnitudes
of the cyclical effects on manufacturing productivity, estimates of the
trend over time in gross output per worker were computed through
regression analysis from the annual series on cotton textiles assembled
by Davis and Stettler (1966) and by Layer (1955), and then the
residuals were compared with the NBER classifications of cyclical
behavior by year (Thorp, 1926). Both sets of residuals indicate some
pro—cyclical variation, with the greatest deviations below trend in
labor productivity being achieved, on average, one year before the
trough of the business cycle. The Davis and Stettler series implies
much greater cyclical variation than the Layer series, but even here
the effect seems somewhat modest. In the average business cycle, labor
productivity, as measured by gross output per worker, fell to only 4.2
percent below trend during the year before the trough.22 Moreover,
over the limited period of time spanned by their date, the magnitude of
the deviation from trend does not appear to have been systematically43
related to the duration of the cycle. It is not clear whether cyclical
variation in labor productivity should be more or less in cotton
textiles than in other industries. Nevertheless, even if the 4.2
percent figure is doubled and applied to all manufacturing industries,
the adjustment for the business cycle in 1820 would not change the
qualitative results concerning the pace of labor productivity growth
over the period under study. Such refinements would be evenless
significant for the other years covered by the data, because none of
them seem to have been associated with extreme cyclical activity.23
It is apparent that taking cyclical factors into consideration
does Dot appreciably alter the interpretation of the finding that these
were major increases in labor productivity across awiderange of
manufacturing industries during the antebell period. Not so clear,
however, is the relative importance of the various contributors, such
as capital deepening or mechanization, to these developments. That
virtually all of the industries investigated realized impressive gains
in labor productivity despite the rather modest degrees of
mechanization and capital intensity in most of them, suggests that
other factors must have played a significant role. An indirect method
of roughly gauging whether capital deepening or mechanization were the
principal determinants of the rate of progress is to examine whether
the records of productivity growth of the capital— and machinery—
intensive industries compared favorably with those of their
Counterparts.
Instead of treating the relationship between the factorTABLE 7
Indexes of Labor Productivity for
Classes of Manufacturing Industries: 1820 to 1860
Mechanized Other Capital—intensive Other
Industries Induitrjes Industries Industries
VLP GQLP VLP GQLP VLP GQLP VLP GQLP
1820 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1850 [183] [246] [153] 1165] [177] [230] [156] [173] (firm)
1850 207 256 179 187 207 249 170 174
(aggregate)
1860 [231] 1287] 1226] 1255] [223] 12771 [239] [269]
(I irn)




1820—1850 [1.81—2.2 [2.71—3.0 [1.5]—1.9 [1.73—2.1 11.73—2.2 [2.53—2.9 11.51—1.8 1.8—11.81
1850—1860[2.8]—3.9 12.31—2.7 2.6—13.8] 2.9—[4.6] 12.73—3.1 2.5—12.7] 3.7—14.2] 3.6—14.6)
1820—1860[2.01—2.6 [2.61—2.9 [2.13—2.1 2.3—12.4] [1.91—2.4 [2.51—2.8 (2.21—2.2 2.3—12.5]45
Table 7
Notes and Sources: These estiiates were computed as weightedaverages
of the industry—specific figures underlying the indexes presented in
Tables 4, 5 and 6. They were calculated with the sane weights employed
in those tables to construct the weighted averages. However, the
weights of the industries in each class were normalized so that their
sun was always equal to one. The mechanized industries include cotton
textiles, wool textiles, paper, glass, mills,andiron. The capital—
intensive industries include cotton textiles, wool textiles,paper,
mills, iron, liquors, and tanning.46
proportions employed and productivity growth through a discussion of
the cases of individual industries, the thirteen industries were ranked
by both capital intensity and machine intensity, on the basis of
information pertaining to 1850 and 1832 respectively, and divided into
two groups for each diznension.24 Weighted averages of the alternative
measures of labor productivity were computed for the various classes of
industries, and indexes and per annum rates of growth derived from them
are presented in Table 7.
Several findings of interest emerge from these estimates.
Perhaps most important is that, over the entire period from 1820 to
1860, all categories of industries registered major increases in labor
productivity. It does appear, however,thatthe more capital—intensive
and machinery—intensive industries generally realized somewhat larger
advances, particularly in terms of GQLP. For example, in the more capital—
intensive industries this measure of labor productivity rose by 177 to
217 (depending on whether the firm or aggregate data is employed)
percent between 1820 and 1860,whereasthose less dependent on capital
managedonly 144 to 169 percent. This differential is consistent with
the view that the utilization of machinery or capital equipment may
havefacilitated changes in production processes that increased the
rate at which raw materials could be prOceBsed into final products with
a given amount of labor.
What is rather puzzling about these comparisons between the
various classes of industries is that the qualitative results appear
sensitive to whether the productivity estimates are derived from the47
samplesoffirm information or from the aggregate data. Especially in
1860, the aggregate figures suggest much greater productivitygrowth
in the capital—intensive and machinery—intensive industries, relative
to their counterparts, than do the estimates obtained from the firm
reports. Since both sets of estimates would be expected to be biased
downward, as discussed above, the substantial disparity might be
thought to shed light on which sources of biases are most serious, and
accordinglyconvey information about the structure of the manufacturing
sector. In particular, it mightseam tosuggest that the
disproportionate sampling of firms in 1860fromless—developed states
biases the firm—level productivity estimates downwardby more than the
aggregate productivity figures areaffectedby the inclusionof part—
timeoperations in the census totals. Such anexplanationdoes not
hold up well, however, to the observation that no industries otherthan
tanning and perhaps cotton textiles have large discrepancies of the
samesignbetween the firm— and aggregate—level productivity estimates
inboth 1850 and 1860.Instead, the sensitivityof the finding of
higher productivity growth in the capital—intensive and machinery—
intensive industries to the choice between the two sets ofestimates
isprimarilyattributable to the enormous differences in 1860for
cotton textiles and paper that have not yet been satisfactorily
accounted for.25
Regardless of the appropriate interpretation of the
significantly more rapid progress of labor productivity implied by the
aggregate data, one must be impressed with the extent of the advances48
realized by those industries with low levels of capital or machinery
intensity. By either measure of labor productivity, these industries
managed growth rates of over 2.0 percent per annum. Despite the
evidence that industries with a greater reliance on capital and
machinery did slightly better, this strong record would seem to bear
against the view that the increasing utilization of these factors of
production per unit of labor were the dominant forces in accounting
for, or encouraging, growth in manufacturing productivity during this
early phase of industrialization.
One might legitimately challenge the persuasiveness of this
argument, on the grounds that a comparison of the rates of productivity
growth between classes of industries defined by their factor
intensities at one moment in time does not bear directly on the issue
of how changes in the ratio of capital to labor over time contributed
to advances in labor productivity. Such a procedure does, however,
establish whether there was an association between the capital
intensity of an industry at a point in time and the future capacity
for, or history of, its productivity growth (depending on whether
capital intensity is measured at the beginning or end of the period in
question), but that is a somewhat different, if related, question. In
this regard, the finding that the rates of advance achieved were nearly
equal across classes of industries tends to suggest that any
relationship between capital intensity and productivity growth was weak
during this phase of industrial developnent. An alternative approach
to the problem of how important capital accumulation was in promoting49
productivity increase would be to formally evaluate howmuchof the
growth in labor productivity over some specified span of time can be
directly attributed, in an accounting sense, to the accumulation of
capital per unit of labor that occurred. Such an analysis entails the
measurement of total factor productivity, and will be carried out in
the next section of the paper.
Another caveat to the interpretation of the comparisons between
the rates of labor productivity growth in machinery— or capital—
intensive industries and their counterparts is that the disparitiesare
significantly smaller f or the entire period from 1820 to 1860 than they
are when attention is restricted to developments before 1850. For
example, the gap in the rate of increase of GQLP between the mechanized
industries and the less mechanized widens from between 2.6—2.9 and 2.3—2.4
percent per annum for 1820 to 1860, to between 2.7—3.0 and 1.7—2.1
percent for 1820 to 1850. This pattern reflects both impressive rates
of advance throughout the period for all industries, and an
accelerationfrom 1850 to 1860 that is especially pronounced among, and
perhaps exclusive to, the less mechanized and capital—intensive
industries. The record of change in the capital to labor ratio is
similar, in that the less mechanized and the less capital—intensive
industries experienced an extraordinary rise between 1850 and 1860,
while their counterparts failed to manifest any robust acceleration.
This perspective on the evidence tends to place somewhatgreater
e!npbasisonthe roles played by mechanization and capital accumulation
in promoting labor productivity growth. Theestimatescan be viewed as50
consistentwith the notion that the advances were initially most rapid
among industries that mechanized, and were highly capital intensive,
early, such as cotton textiles, and that the pace of progress in the
rest of the manufacturing sector was boosted as sophisticated capital
equipment began to be diffused more broadly during the 1840s and 1850s.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that many industries, such as hats and
furniture/woodwork, realized substantial increases in productivity
while they were still utilizing small amounts of capital per unit of
labor and little or no machinery.
The findings thus support the judgement that there may have
been two general sources, or perhaps "stages", of productivity growth
in manufacturing during early industrialization. The first wave of
advances seems to have been associated, in many industries, with
changes in the organization of labor and other alterations in
production processes that did not involve large adjustments in the
capital to labor ratio (Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982; Sokoloff, 1984b).
Thegains from these sorts of improvements were eventually to be
exhausted, but a second class of innovations related to the
introduction of sophisticated capital equipment followed, leading
perhaps to an acceleration of labor productivity growth (Chandler,
1977; Atack, 1985). These stylized "stages" undoubtedly fail to
describe the experience of all manufacturing industries; indeed, it is
apparent that industries passed through them at different rates and
periods, and that the timing of the diffusion of the new production
methods may have varied across firms within industries with location51
and other characteristics. Moreover, changes in production techniques
that encompassed aspects of both '1stages" at once were implemented in
some industries. It is difficult to determine precisely how important
each development was in explaining labor productivity growth,
particularly with only the bodies of evidence examined here. An
exploration of more comprehensive measures of productivity should,
however, help to improve our assessment of at least the relative
significance of the various contributors.52
III
Although the estimates of labor productivity growth presented
above are quite informative about the record of industrial development
in the Northeast, broadening the investigation of productivity to
include other factors as inputs can extend our knowledge further. It
makes possible, in particular, the decomposition of the growth in labor
productivity between the amounts attributable to increases in capital
and raw materials utilized per unit of labor, and that due to advances
in total factor productivity. Such inform.ation will in turn contribute
to our understanding of the evolution of production methods and help to
determine how important physical capital accumulation was during the
early stages of industrialization.
It is useful to begin the treatment of total factor
productivity by examining the indexes of real partial factor
productivity reported in Table 8. These figures indicate the industry—
specific movements over the period in the ratios of gross output to raw
materials, capital, and labor. Several features of these estimates
deserve comment. The first is that in nearly all industries, each
of these ratios of partial factor productivity increases between 1820
and 1860. Although the liquors and tobacco industries do diverge
slightly from this pattern, neither case appears to contradict
significantly the general result as the decreases they manifest are
small and sensitive to the choice between firm— and aggregate—level
estimates. Since the index of total factor productivity is equivalentTA3LE 8
Indexes of Real Partial Factor Productivity:
1820 to 1860
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Notes and Sources: See the note to Table 1. The nominal values of the
respective measures of partial factor productivity were converted to
constant dollars with the industry—specific price indexes presented in
Table 3. These estimates were then normalized relative to a base of
100 representing the respective induatrys levels in 1820.55
to a weighted average of these individual ratios, it is accordingly
obvious that any reasonable measure of the former would rise aver the
period in all industries.
Another pattern in the data that merits enphasis is that, in
all industries, labor productivity increased much more over the period
than either raw materials or capital productivity. While the gains in
labor productivity between 1820 and 1860 were typically very large, the
advances in raw materials productivity observed are quite modest.
Capital productivity appears to have generally increased less than
labor and more than raw material, productivity, although there are a
few prominent deviations from this pattern where it also failed to
keep up with the rise in the latter (i.e. liquors and flour/grist
mills). This evidence suggests that, in general, manufacturing
production methods evolved over time in such ways as to reduce the
amounts of labor and, to a lesser extent, capital required to process a
unit of raw materials into final product. It conforms well with the
work of scholars who have argued that many of the innovations
introduced by manufacturers during this period were intended to
substitute relatively cheap raw materials for other inputs (Rabakkuk,
1962).
y dividing GQ/L by GQIX or GQ/RM,onecan calculate the
change over time in the ratios of capital or raw materials to labor
from the information provided in Table 8. These latter ratios indicate
that northeastern manufacturing did shift somewhat toward more capital—
intensive production processes, asjudgedby the capital to labor56
ratio, between 1820 and 1860. Bowever, the extent of this adjustment
in factor proportions pales by comparison with the dramatic surge in
raw materials intensity that occurred contemporaneously. Whereas the
weighted—average growth in the ratio of rawmaterialsto labor was in
the 118—127 percent range, the rise in capital per unit of labor
amounted to only 67—72 percent. It is striking that both of these
increases in the utilization of other inputs per unit of labor are
proportionally much lower than the estimated growth in GQLP during the
period. This finding casts additional doubt on whether either raw
materials accumulation or capital accumulation, but especially the
latter, could play the dominant role in explaining the advance in labor
productivity.
There is, of course, substantial variation across the
industries in the extent of the movement toward greater capital
intensity, and some of th experienced significantly larger shifts
than the average did. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, the
increase in the ratio of capital to labor was not sufficiently massive
in any industry to directly account for a major share of the progress
realized in labor productivity. Moreover, it ii interesting that the
industries that underwent the st extensive capital deepening during
the period may have been those that were most capital intensive to
begin withe Industries such as liquors, flour/grist mills, paper,
tanning, and wool textiles, which were among the seven most capital
intensive of the thirteen in 1820, appear to have experienced the
largest increases in the capital to labor ratio. Conversely, several57
of the less capital—intensive industries, boots/shoes,
furniture/woodwork, and hats, were among those with the smallest
percentage gains. Weighted averages of the two classes of industries
reveal that the capital to labor ratio rose by 57—91 percent over the
period in the more capital—intensive industries (as indentified at
either 1820 or 1850), and by 16—95 percent in their counterparts.
Since the estimated range of increase for the former class of
industries does not unambiguously dominate that for the latter, one
cannot make an unqualified claim that those industries that were
initially most capital intensive carried out more capital deepening.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the classes of industries were not
converging in their degrees of capital intensity, and that many remained
highly labor intensive throughout the period.26
A final point to make about the indexes of partial factor
productivity is that they imply that the doubts some scholars have
raised concerning the accuracy of the census valuations of the capital
invested in manufacturing firms are unwarranted. The chief question
about the usefulness of the reported capital input has been whether
establishments included working capital in their statements to census
enutnerators.27 If, as some have argued, they didnot, then estimates
of both the growth of capital intensity and of total factor
productivity over time would likely be confounded. The possible
seriousness of the problem can be evaluated with the more detailed
information on the composition of capital investments contained in the
1832 sample drawn from the McLane Report. These data include separate58
assessments of the value of capital invested in land and structures,
tools and machinery1andinventories (Sokoloff, 1984*).
Since the bulk of the capital investment was in working
capital, and the 1832 estimates of total factor productivity arid the
capital to labor ratio were based on valuations of the capital input
that included inventories, one would expect to observe some stark
contrasts between the estimates from that year and those from 1820 or
1850 if working capital had not been incorporated as part of the
reported capital investments in the censuses of the other years.
Morespecifically,there would be large decreases in total factor
productivity and substantial increases in capital intensity between
1820 and 1832,especiallyin those industries in which investment in
working capital was relatively important. No such patterns emerge, nor
do the differentials in total factor productivity across industries,
varying with the relative investments in fixed and working capital,
that would be evident in the 1820, 1850, and 1860 data if their
information on capital investments did not include at least a major
component of the working capital. It thus seems unlikely that
undervaluation of working capital in manufacturing censuses was a
serious defect, and correspondingly that the estimates of the growth in
total factor productivity and capital intensity are significantly
distorted as a consequence.
Indexes of real total factor productivity, based on the
two alternative definitions of output, are presented for the thirteen





Index of Total Factor Productivity:
Computed with Value Added astheMeasure of Output
























































































































































































































































































1126) 1162) 182 1203) 231
(132] 1177] 191 1207] 24160
Table 9
Notes and Sources: These estimates of total factor productivity were
computed over the samesetsof observations as the corresponding labor
productivity estimates presented in Table 1 and 4 were. See the notes
to Tables 1 and 4. The index of total factor productivity for the
weighted average of the industries was computed with the same weights,
and in the same manner, as the index of labor productivity reported in
the latter table. The output elasticities employed in the computation
were selected from a range derived by estimating Cobb—Douglas
production functions over each cross—sectional sample. These
regressions yielded estimates of the capital coefficient between 0.25
and 0.30. The latter value was employed here so as to increase the
estimate of the inputs in the later years relative to the earlier.
The formulation of total factor productivity employed here is:
NFP —(vA/K030L0'70),
whereNFP is a measure of total factor productivity utilizing value
added as the measure of output, VA is value added, K is the value of
the capital invested, and L is the labor input. The calculations of
NFP were performed after the values of gross output, raw materials, and
capital had been deflated to constant dollars, utilizing the price
indexes reported in Table 3. These "real" estimates of total factor























































































































Indexof Total Factor Productivity:
Conputedwith Cross Output as the Measureof Output

































































3 100 1109] 1136] 144 1170] 178
1 100 1113) (148] 152 (171] 18462
Table 10
Notes and Sources: These estimates of total factor productivity were
computed over the same sets of observations as the corresponding labor
productivity estimates preserved in Table 2 and 5 were. See the notes
to those tables. The index of total factor productivity for the weighted
average of the industries was computed with the same weights, and in
the same manner, as the index of labor productivity reported in Table
5. The output elasticities were selected from a range provided by
Cobb—Douglas production functions estimated cross—sectionally. The
choice was influenced by the desire to have the coefficients for
capital and raw materials to be on the high aide io as to depress the
estimated rates of productivity growth. The formulation of total
factor productivity ployed here is:
TFP —C QIRIf°'54L033x03),
where TFP is a measure of total factor productivity utilizing the gross
value of output as the measure of output, RNisthe value of raw
materials,L is the labor input, and. is the value of capital
invested. All of the relevant variables were deflated to constant
dollars, by the indexes in Table 3, before the calculations were
performed. These "real" estimates of total factor productivity were
then normalized relative to a 1820 standard of 100.63
reported above, the estimates were computed for each of three sets of
sub—samples of firmsso asto demonstrate the insensitivity of the
results to the extent of adjustment for part—time firms, and the price
indexes appearing in Table 3 were employed to convert the nominal
measures of gross output, value added, raw materials, and capital to
constant dollars before productivity was calculated.
The results indicate that by either of the two measures, nearly
all industries realized substantial growth in total factor productivity
between 1820 and 1860. Weighted averages of the records of the
individual industries yield estimated increases ranging from 103 to 131
percent with output is defined as value added (NIP) and from 70 to 78
percent by the alternative gauge (TFP). Each industry performed
veil by at least one measure. Flour/grist mills registered the smallest
advance in NIP, only 18 to 19 percent, but the estimated gain in TIP
approached 60 percent; and although tobacco ranked at the bottom in
termsofprogress inTIP,its increases of 30—48 percent in that
measure, and 71—116 percent in NIParenot unimpressive. The cotton
textiles, wool textiles, and paper industries are amongthoseattaining
the largest estimated increases in total factor productivity, but major
gains were also achieved by industries such as furniture/woodwork and
hats, which were among the least capital intensive and mechanized
throughout the period. These figures provide dramatic testimony to how
dynamicthe manufacturing sector was during the early stages of
industrialization. Moreover, they serve to undercut the hypothesis that
capital accumulation was the driving force behind productivity growth64
during this era. The substantial increases in total factor
productivity demonstrate clearly that the bulk of the gains in labor
productivity cannot be directly accounted for by capital or raw
materials deepening within manufacturing firms. In addition, the wide
range of industries that shared in this general advance of productivity
suggests that the phenomenon can not be attributed to developments such
as the diffusion of new and more sophisticated capital equipment, which
touched only a relatively limited number of industries until late in
the period.
The consistency of the finding of large gains in total factor
productivity, across industries and measures, bolsters confidence in
the robustness of the qualitative result. Moreover, as the minor
differences between the .and.setsof estimates suggest, the basic
picture that emerges is not sensitive to any reasonable adjustments of
the sub—samples to account for the existence of part—time
establishments.28 It is also encouraging to note that there are fewer
implausible fluctuations in these estimates than in the indexes of
labor productivity, particularly with the TFP measure. Several
industries do continue to manifest strange records of progress, but in
at least the most troubling cases, paper, tanning, and tobacco, the
price indexes relied on are suspect and likely the primary source of
the problems. The other questionable features may also be attributable
to the inappropriate or defective nature of the price series utilized,
or an inadequate number of observations in some years. Whatever the
explanation for these anomalies, however, the fundamental results doTABLE 11
Crovtb Rates of Total Factor Productivity
in Selected Manufacturing Industries:1820 to 1860
1820—1832 1820—1850 1850—1860 1820—1860
2 2 2 2
Boots/Shoes NIP — 1.3—1.6 1.9—2.9 1.4—2.0
TIP — 0.8—1.0 2.9—3.3 1.3—1.6
Coacbes/ NIP —0.7 1.9—2.1 1.2—1.5 1.7—1.9
Barnesses TIP 0.3 1.6—1.6 0.3—0.5 1.3—1.3
Cotton NIP 5.2 1.8—3.0 2.7—3.6 2.3-2.9 Textile. TIP 1.8 1.0—1.4 2.4—2.6 1.4—1.7
Furniture! NIP 2.2 2.4—2.9 2.1—3.8 2.7—2.8
Woodwork TIP 1.4 2.2—2.5 0.7—1.8 2.0—2.1
Glass NIP 7.7 3.3 —1.0 2.2
TIP 4.5 2.5 —0.9 1.6
Bats NIP 2.4 2.0—2.5 2.3—2.7 2.1—2.5
TIP 0.7 1.2—1.4 2.2—2.4 1.4-1.6
Iron NIP 0.7—0.8 2.9—3.6 1.4—1.4
TIP 0.6—0.7 2.3—2.5 1.1—1.1
Liquors NIP 0.4—1.6 0.5—3.5 1.2—1.3
TIP 0.9—1.6 0.2—2.3 1.2
Flour/ NIP —0.4—0.4 0.6—2.8 0.4—0.4
Grist Mills TIP 1.2—1.5 0.3—1.2 1.2—1.2
Paper NIP 3.6 5.0-5.4 —0.4—3.3 3.9—4.5
TIP 0.2 2.2—2.4 2.0—3.8 2.3—2.6
RIP 1.2 1.2—2.4 —2.7— —0.8 0.7—1.1
TIP 0.7 0.6—1.1 1.1—1.8 0.9—1.1
Tobacco NIP — —0.3—0.8 3.1—8.9 1.4—2.0
TIP — 0.0—0.4 1.5—4.0 0.7—1.0
Wool NIP 3.2 1.0—2.0 3.8—6.4 2.4—2.5
Textiles TIP 0.9 0.5—0.9 4.7—5.8 1.8—1.9
Weighted RIP 11.8] 11.5]—1.9 12.3)—2.4 L1.7J.2.0
Average TIP 10.8) 11.03—1.2 [2.23—2.2 11.33—1.8
6566
Table 11
Notes Sources:These per annum rates of total factor productivity
growth were computed from the set .estimatesreported in Tables 9
and 10. See the notes to those tables. The NFP estimates are of the
growth of total factor productivity measured with value added as
output. The TFP estimates are based on the measure of total factor
productivity that ploys gross output as the measure of output and
explicitly treats the value of raw materials as an input.67
not depend upon their inclusion in the manufacturing average..
Estimates of the per annum growth rate. of total factor
productivity have been computed from the indexes reported in Tables 9
and 10 for the entire period between 1820 and 1860, as veil as for
several sub—periods. They aze presented in Table 11, and confirm that
a wide spectrum of manufacturing industries in the Northeast enjoyed
rapid progress in total factor productivity during this initial phase
of industrialization. Indeed, the weighted—averageper annum growth
rates for these thirteen industries match, if not exceed, the
performance of the U. S. economy during other periods. Between 1820
and 1860, northeastern manufacturing appears to have achievedper annum
rates of increase of 1.7—2.0 percent in NFP and 1.3—1.8 in TFP. These
figures might be compared to the 1.8 percent rate for NYP estimated by
lendrick (1961) for the national manufacturing sector between 1869 and
1953, or to the 0.8—0.9 and 1.4 percent rates computed by Gailman
(1986) for the annual increase in TYP for theeconomy at large during
the respective periods 1840—1900 and 1900—1960. Although some might
react to the application of these standards by rejecting the early
manufacturing rates of advance as implausibly high, it should be
remembered that one vould expect the pace of productivity growth in the
most dynamic sector of the most burgeoning region during the period to
have surpassed that for the national economy or for U. S. manufacturing
in total. Rence, the finding that northeasternmanufacturing might
have realized faster rates of total factor productivity increase during
its initial burst of expansion than economy—wideaverages, pertaining68
to the same or other periods, should perhaps not be too surprising.
These estimates further suggest, as did those for labor
productivity growth, that productivity rose, on average, more slowly
between 1820 and 1850 than during the 1850s. The average rate of
advance in TFP, for example, increased from 1.5—1.9 percent per annum
over tbe first thirty years to 2.3—2.4 percent during the later ten.
The pattern of acceleration ii, admittedly, somewhatweakerif one
focuses on the contrast between 1820—1832 and 1832—1860, and only on
those industries for which 1832 figures are available. Nevertheless,
even here, the weight of the evidence seems to favor a mild increase in
the pace of total factor productivity growth. Many researchers have
contended that such an acceleration may have resulted from a spurt in
the accumulation of more and better capital equipment, during the 1840s
and 1850s (Chandler, 1977; David, 1977; Williamson and Lindert, 1980).
They might tend to argue that the process of capital deepening only
seems unimportant, because the conventional measures of inputs fail to
fully detect the technical change that is embodied in newer vintages of
capital. The acceleration of total factor productivity growth during a
decade of more rapid diffusion of machinery is certainly consistent
with this interpretation, but alternative explorations of this feature
of the economic record are also available.29
Although some of technical change realized between 1820 and
1860 was undoubtedly embodied in capital goods there are several
reasons to doubt whether a proper accounting for this phenomenon would
be capable of reversing the qualitative conclusion concerning the69
significanceof capital accumulation for productivity growth in early
manufacturing. First, even if one were to ascribe as much as half of
the acceleration in total factor productivity increase to improvements
of manufacturing capital not reflected in its price the amount of
productivity growth so generated would be quite small relative to the
total realized over the entire period. One might claim that more of
the estimated advance in total factor productivity should be credited
to embodied technical change unincorporated in price, but the rationale
for this appears weak. Not only did the less capital—intensive and
less mechanized industries do quite veil before the purported
consequential developments of the 1840.and1850., but their
investments in machinery and tools per unit of labor remainedquite
small in absolute terms,asveil as inrelationto their total
investment in capital, at the end of the period. Even most of the
counterpart industries, classified as more mechanized and capital—
intensive, had rather modest absolute and relative amounts invested in
capital equipment that was directly involved in production (Sokoloff,
1984a). Given that manufacturing industries had the bulk of their
investments in structures and inventories, there would seem to be
severe limits on the amount of embodied technical change that the
capital input could plausibly be endowed with.30
Oneapproachto evaluating the importance of embodied technical
change is to compare the records of total factor productivity
growth between the more capital—intensive and tbe less capital
intensive industries, or between the more mechanized and less70
TA3LE 12
Indexe,of Total Factor Productivity for
Classe. of Marufacturing Industries: 1820 to 1860
Mechanized Other Capital—intensive Other
Industries Industries Industries Industries
NFP TFP FTP TFP FTP TPP FTP TPP
1820 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1850 [168] [137) 1155] [134] [160] [134] (164] (143]
(firm)
1850 182 142 181 147 181 142 182 151
(aggregate)
1860 [217] [172] 1186] (166] [205] 1169] (200] [173]
(firm)




1820—185011.63—1.8 [1.13—1.2 (1.53—2.0 [1.03—1.3[1.4]—1.9 11.03—1.2 [1.7]—2.0 [1.21—1.4
1850—1860(2.83—3.3 12.31—2.4 1.4—11.7) 1.8—12.1]2.3—12.5] 2.2—12.3] [1.81—2.4 [2.01—2.2
1820—1860[1.91—2.2 [1.43—1.5 (1.51—1.9 [1.31—1.4 11.71—2.0 [1.31—1.4 [1.71—2.1 11.41—1.671
Table 12
Notes and Sources: These estinLates were coiputed as weightedaverages
of the industry—specific figures presented underlying the indexes
presented in Tables 9 10, and 11. The weighted averages were
constructed with the systeui of weighting euiployed in Table 7. See the
notes to those tables.72
mechanized one;. The logic underlying this procedure is that where
new vintages of capital are endowed with embodied technical change, the
measured increase over time in the inputs utilized by firms will be
lower, relative to the outputs produced, and hence, measured total factor
productivity higher. Given that one would expect the realization of
technical change embodied in capital and not incorporated in its
price to be associated with either the size of the capital input
relative to other inputs, or the change in that relative size of the
capital input over the period in question, the more capital—intensive
and mechanized industries might seem likely to have enjoyed greater
total factor productivity growth than the others if this component of
embodied technical change was of much quantitative significance.31
Although, as discussed above, the evidence of significantly more
capital deepening over the period by these classes of industries is not
entirely robust, it is clear that they did employ larger amounts of
capital and machinery per unit of labor throughout the period, and
carried out at least as much capital deepening as their less capital—
intensive and mechanized counterparts did. One would, accordingly,
expect them to exhibit more total factor productivity growth.
When one examines the indexes of total factor productivity
presented in Table 12 for classes of manufacturing industries, however,
only minor differences in performance emerge.32 The discrepancies in
the amount of productivity growth realized between the more and less
capital—intensive industries are trivial in magnitude and vary in sign
with the choice between measures. As for the other system ofTABLE 13
Decomposition of the Growth in Gross Output per Equivalent Worker
Between Proportions Accounted for by Increases in Capital Intensity,
Raw Materials Intensity, and Total Factor Productivity:
1820 to 1860
XDue IDue ZDue
to (r/L) to(R?/L) toTFP
Boots/Shoes F 11% 34% 54%
A 1 25 74
Coaches/ F 9 29 61
Rarmesses A 7 19 74
Cotton F —2 48 54 Textiles A 5 46 49
Furniture! F 4 27 68
Woodwork A 4 26 70
Glass F — — —
A 5 37 57
Bat. F 5 49 46
A 0 40 60
Iron F 3 42 55
A 6 30 63
Liquors F 11 28 61
A 14 21 65
Flour! F 12 30 57
GristMills A 12 30 58
Paper F 3 52 44
A 6 50 43
Tanning F 11 43 46
A 11 46 43
Tobacco P 16 59 25
A 4 28 68
Wool F 4 44 51
Textiles A 5 46 49
7374
Table 13
Notes Sources:The decomposition of the growth in grois output per
equivalent worker was based on the accounting information:
* * * *
GQLP TFP+ 0.13(x/L) +0.54(R.M/L),
where *signifiesa derivative of the log. The decomposition applies
to the firms included in the .sub—samples.See the notes to Tables 5
and 8.75
classification, the more mechanized industries do seem to have
experienced higher rates of advance than the less mechanized did.
However, these disparities are small relative to the rates of increase,
particularly when TFP servesasthe gauge for total factor
productivity. Another feature of these estimates that bears against
the hypothesis that much of the technical change realized was
embodied in physical capital and not reflected in its price is the
relative decline in the rate of total factor productivitygrowth of the
less mechanized and capital—intensive industries, ascompared to their
counterpart classes betweenthesub—periods 1820—1850 and 1850—1860.
As already alluded to, the rates of increase of both capitalintensity
andlaborproductivity accelerated sharply between the two sub—periods
among the former classes of industries relative to the latter.33 If
the capital investments involved considerable embodied technical
change, then one would expect a relative increase in the pace of total
factor productivity in less mechanized and capital—intensive industries
to have accompanied the relative surge in capital deepening and labor
productivity.
Regardless of how persuasive these arguments for questioning
the extent of embodied technical change are, it is informative to
decompose the growth over the period in gross output per equivalent
worker between the amounts directly attributable, in an accounting
sense, to increases in capital intensity (XIL), in raw materials
intensity (RM/L),andin total factor productivity (TFP). The results
of such a procedure are reported in Table 13, with separate estimates76
presented for the estimates obtained fromthefirmdataand those from
the aggregate data. They indicate that in most industries the increase
between 1820 and 1860incapital intensity explains less than 10
percent of the growth in labor productivity as measured by GQLP.
Indeed, in no case does the share exceed 16 percent. Advances in total
factor productivity, on the other hand, appear to be the principal
force behind labor productivity growth, generally accounting for over
half of the increase in GQLP and never below 25 percent.34 These
findings dramatize how remarkably limited the importance of capital
deepening was in generating labor productivity growth during early
industrialization. They imply that if capital accumulation played a
substantial role at all, it was due to improvements in capital that
were not reflected in price. Given the basis for skepticism about the
extent to which technical progress was embodied in capital outlined
above, other sources of total factor productivity, and thus of labor
productivity, growth would appear to deserve more attention.77
-
Iv
This paper has relied on four cross—sections of anufacturiug
firm data to study the growth of labor and total factor productivity
during early industrialization in the U. S.. Although the bodies of
evidence analyzed suffer from some defects1 the procedures employed in
constructing the estimates were designed to deal with the problems and
yield growth rates that would be biased downward. Despite this concern
for producing conservative estimates, the results indicate that a wide
range of manufacturing industries realized major increases in both
labor and total factor productivity as early as the 1820s, and
continued to do so, at an accelerated pace, through 1860. The
breadth, magnitude, and timing of the advances observed suggest that
the northeastern manufacturing sector was a dynamic one, whose
productivity growth, perhaps coupled with similar gains in agriculture,
fueled the process of industrialization in that region. The evidence
would seem to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the view that
the onset of industrial expansion in the Northeast was primarily due to
the release of labor and other resources from a stagnant and declining
agricultural sector.
Of perhaps even greater interest, the estimates imply that
increases in total factor productivity, sometimes referred to as the
residual, accounted for most of the advance in labor productivity
between 1820 and 1860. The deepening of capital, in contrast, appears
to have made only a modest contribution. Although it is possible that78
a major share of the growth in the residual over the period consisted
of technical change embodied in capital equipment, which would enhance
the significance of capital in explaining the gains in productivity,
the shreds of evidence that can be gleaned from these data do not
support this notion. Capital accumulation may indeed have had
important influences on the course of early industrial development,
such as through allowing for the extension of the transportation
network and other social overhead capital, but the introduction of
sophisticated capital equipment and capital deepening in general were
evidently not as central to the initial phase of industrialization as
they have sometimes been depicted. On the contrary, the material
examined here seems to suggest that other sources of measured
productivity growth in manufacturing, including the changes in labor
organization and the intensification of work that have been emphasized
in recent studies, played the leading roles (Lazonick and Brush, 1985;
Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982; Sokoloff, 1984b). Although many questions
remain, the results also appear to be consistent with, if not to
actually support, the view that the expansion of markets that
accompanied the onset of industrialization unleashed powerful forces
that acted to raise productivity. At least in the U. S., pre—
industrial manufacturing seems to have had the potential, which it was
ultimately to realize, for substantial gains in efficiency without
major additions to the stock of capital equipment.79
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1. Nearly all studies of productivity growthduring this period have
been based on information that was either highly aggregatedor drawn
from only to a small number of cotton textile firms (David, 1967,
1975, 1977; Davis and Stettler, 1966; Gailman, 1972a, 1972b, 1986;
Layer, 1955; }cCou1d..k, 1968; Nickless, 1979; Williamson, 1972).80
2. Each of the data Bets suffers from problems of sample selection
bias. The coverage of the 1820 Census of Manufactures and the
McLane Report differed substantially by geographic region and size
of establishment, with an apparent net result of an undersampling
of smaller, and accordingly less productive, firms. The design of
the samples from 1850 and 1860 led to a disproportionate
representation of firms from states with limited industrial
development. See Sokoloff (1982) and Atack, Bateman, and Weiss (1979)
for details on the characteristics of these sample.. Since the
sample selection biases are likely to raise the estimated
productivity levels for 1820 and 1832, and reduce them in 1850
and 1860,therates of productivity growth computed from these sources
should understate the actual record.
3. The industrial classification system employed in the 1850 Census
was in general adopted, but several of the industry definitions
industries used here include two or more of the 1850 categories.
The reluctance to combine data from different industries stemmed
from a concern about the possibility of confusing increases over
time in labor productivity within industries with variation in the
estimates due to changes in industrial composition.
4. This generalization about the reporting practices of part—time
establishtrerti is based primarily on an examination of the81
schedules for roughly 200 firms in the 1820 and 1832 samples that
specified the fractions of the year they were in operation. Rather
than expunging observations of sea8onal enterprises from the
calculations, one would of course prefer to have accurate
assessments of their inputs and outputs to work with so that their
levels of performance would be reflected in the estimates. It is
likely that part—time firms, whose relative importance declined
over time, were indeed less efficient producers than their full—
time counterparts. Accordingly, to the extent that the adjustments
in the composition of the sub—samples do succeed in excluding all
part—time establishments from consideration, the estimates of
productivity growth might tend to understate the advances realized
over the period by failing to pick up the perhaps important gains
to the economy of displacing seasonal operators with full—time
producers.
5.It is admittedly unclear what fractions of manufacturing firms in
the various years were operating significantly fewer than 50 weeks
per year (full—time). A general sense of the orders of magnitude
has, however, been obtained from the reports by many firms in 1832
of the fraction of the year they were in operation, from an
examination of the cross—sectional distributions of establishments
by industry, size, wage rates, and location, as well as from
inspections of the distributions of firms by measures of total
factor prodiirrivtv. The approach adopted in preparing the three82
sets of estimates was not to attempt a precise delineation of the
proportion of firms operating part—time in the individual years,
but rather to demonstrate that no plausible assumptions about the
changes in their relative numbers would reverse the qualitative
findings. Although ad hoc in nature, this manner of displaying
the patterns in the data appears effective. Onecancheck the
sensitivity of the industry—specific results by comparing the
figures from the three sets of estimates, or by evaluating the
figures for 1820 with respect to thefigures for the later
years. The extent of the allowance for the decreasing prevalence
of part—time firmsimpliedby this latter comparison appears to
be extremely generous.
6. In this paper, such summaries of the quantitative results are based
on the choice of the 1860 estimates computed from the aggregate data
as the standard for that year.
7. The weights employed to construct the averages consist of the
industry shares of total northeastern value added and gross output
respectively in 1850, and were calculated from U. S. Census Bureau
(1858). The two point estimates available for twelve of the
industries in 1850 and 1860, as veil as the growth rates they
enter into, will henceforth be expressed as a range of estimates
(i.e. 72—112 percent).83
8. The general robustness of the results is apparent from the
observation that the estimates of labor productivity in 1820 are
greatly affected by the shift from thesub—sample to the in
only a few industries. The value—added figures are considerably
more sensitive to the subset of establishments employed in the
calculations, but even by this measure, only three of the
industries have their levels of labor productivity raised by as
much as 15 percent.
9. Of greatest concern in this regard are the glass, liquors, and
tobacco industries. All of these industries are characterized by
having estimates based on very few observations in at least one of
the years. Random variation in the estimates due to this source
may magnify the impact of sample selection bias in some cases.
For example, the extremely high levels of productivity estimated
for the glass industry in 1832 is probably related to their being
computed from information on a rather small number of glass—making
enterprises in Massachusetts. The most advanced plants in that
industry were located in Massachusetts (Davis, 1949), and that
state accounted for a disproportionate share of the firms included
in the McLane Report.
10. The 1850 and 1860 samples were designed to ensure that each state
accounted for a certain minimum number of observations. This
feature of their collection led to an over—sampling of84
manufacturing firms from smaller and less—developed states such as
Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The establishments located in
such states operated, on average, at lover levels of productivity.
Accordingly, one would expect that this source of sample selection
bias would lead to underestimates of productivity. In principle,
one should be able to correct for this sample selection problem by
re—weighting the observations. In practice, however, inconsistent
evidence from the aggregate census reports and the firm samples on
the industrial composition of state manufacturing sectors suggests
that there are other defects in the samples that confound the
identification of the appropriate set of weights.
11. It is, of course, important to recognize that the great majority
of the price series pertain to only a single output or raw material
of the respective industries. Hence, they undoubtedly introduce
errors, and must be applied with caution. The four industries for
which raw materials indexes could not be retrieved are
coaches/harnesses, glass, hats, and iron. The Wholesale Price
Index constructed by Warren and Pearson was employed as a
reasonable substitute in these cases, because it behaves more like
the average of the other raw materials series than the alternative
general indexes. Another deficiency is that in two industries,
tobacco and tanning, the author was compelled to rely on basically
the same price index for both outputs and raw materials. It is
especially unfotuute that separate indexes could not be obtained85
for these industries, because the indexes, which pertain primarily
to the price of raw materials, move quite erratically. Additional
information on whether the prices of outputs and raw materials in
each of these industries actually followed such peculiar paths
would be quite helpful. It seems likely that the extraordinary
variability in these price indexes accounts for at least some of
the irregular movements in the productivity growth estimates for
these industries.
12. In cases where there were several alternative price indexes
available, the most conservative, with respect to the estimation
of the increase in productivity over time, were generally selected.
13. This suggests that a significant portion of the variability in the
labor productivity estimates is due to sharp changes in the factor
proportions utilized.
14. The extreme decline in the price index forpaper output invites
skepticism. Rovever, it should be noted that the general
stability between 1820 and 1860 in the ratio of gross output to
raw materials in that industry would seem to suggest that the
output price index might not be far off in terms of the extent of
the decrease over the entire period.
15. As was mentic: ahoy.., the price indexes for tanning and tobacco86
fluctuate wildly, particularly between 1859 and 1860. The erratic
behavior of the index for "hides and leather" may also affect
estimates for boots/shoes, because that series serves as the index
for raw materials in that industry, as well as for both outputs
and raw materials in tanning.
16. The argument presented in this paragraph applies to estimates of
productivity growth that employ value added as the measure of
output. Rence, it supplies a rationale for why the
value—added figures might indicate less advance over the period
than those relying on gross output as the appropriate measure of
product. Given the uncertainty about the accuracy of the
individual price indexes, however, any conclusions about the
relative performance of two industries, regardless of the measure
of productivity referred to, should be offered tentatively.
17. There are, admittedly, some scholars who judge part—time
operations to be the rule during the early stages of
industrialization, rather than the exception. Moreover, few would
expect there to be many firms in industries such as flour/grist
mills that were in production all year. Nevertheless, the
enumerators for the McLane Report indicated that the overwhelming
majority of the establishments included in that survey claimed to
be in operation for at least 50 weeks a year. Although the level
of production in any individual firm may have been characterized87
by enormous seasonal variation, there might have been tasks that
required at least some workers to be employed throughout the year.
As long as enterprises in such circumstances reported their
average labor and capital inputs, they should, for our purposes,
have been classified as full—time operators and included in the
subsets of firms over which the estimates were prepared.
18. As is apparent from the evidence presented in Goldin and Sokoloff
(1982), the ratio of female to adult male wages increased from
roughly the 0.25—0.35 range in 1820 to roughly the 0.45—0.55 range
in 1850 and beyond. Hence, to the extent that thewage ratio
reflects the average relative productivity of the two groups, it
might be argued that employing the same weights in all years leads
to overestimates of the amount of productivity growth. The
issue turns, however, on whether the change in the relative
productivity of females is due to variation over time in the age
or skill composition of workers, or to some other factors. In any
case, a wide range of weights for females and boys were tested,
and the general qualitative results were found to be insensitive
to reasonable variation in them.
19. It was further assumed that in no industry at 1850 or 1860 did
boys account for more than 33 percent of the male labor force.
Such a constraint, probably serves to bias upward the estimates of
the labor injt. fi veral industries. This ceiling on the88
proportion of males who were boys was introduced as another way of
ensuring that the estimates of the labor input in the later years
would err on the high side, if at all.
20. This would be expected, because of the scale economies present in
most manufacturing industries (Sokoloff, 1984b). The bias is
likely to have been greater in the 1832 sample, because
Massachusetts firms accounted for a highly disproportionate share
of the enterprises covered by that survey, and generally were larger
and had higher than average levels of measured productivity.
21. For example, the weighted average of the industry rate of growth
in gross output per equivalent worker, as computed from the
estimates for 1820 and the B estimates for 1860, ranges between
2.3 and 2.5 percent per annum. These figures are only slightly
lover than the 2.5 to 2.7 range derived from the employment of the
estimates for both years.
22. The Davis and Stettler series might be expected to yield estimates
of the variation in output per worker over the business cycle that
were downward biased, because their figures pertain to output per
man—hour. See Davis and Stettler (1966).
23. One caveat to this generalization is that the iron and steel
industry .o have been quite depressed during the late89
1840s and early 1850s. See Temin (1964).
24. The industries were ordered in termsof capital intensity by the
information on their aggregate capital to laborratios in the
Northeast obtained from U. S. Census Bureau(1858), and then
divided into groups. The same classificationof industries is
derived from the 1820 firm data. Theranking by machinery
intensity was computed from information contained inthe 1820 and
1832 samples of firm data,particularly the latter, as well as in
U. S. Census Office (1895). Industrieswere placed in categories
on the basis of estimates of the investment inmachinery per unit
of labor computed for 1832.
25. The cotton textile establishmentsin the firm samples were, on
average, also smaller and substantially less capital intensivethan
their counterparts in theaggregate data. Their level8 of total
factor productivity were, however, not muchlover. The massive
disparity in measured labor productivitymay accordingly be due to
the less—developed states, whichwere over—represented in the
samples, being characterized by a much differentsystem or type of
Cotton manufacture.
26.It must also be admitted that these indexesof partial factor
productivity not infrequently exhibit irregular, ifnot
implausible, movements from one point in time toanother, as veil90
as discrepancies between the firmandaggregate level estimates
for 1850 and 1860. Just as was contended above in discussing the
labor productivity figures, many of the former type of problems
may be due to inaccurate price indexes, excessive variability in
point estimates because of a small number of observations, or
sample selection biases. The disparities between the independent
estimates for 1850 and 1860 are disturbing, but they might again
be partially explained by many of the firm—level estimates being
based on the characteristics of relatively few firms located in
unrepresentative areas. These anomalies in the data indicate that
much caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions,
particularly with respect to changes over short periods, but they
do not justify a blanket dismissal of the results.
27. The other principal issue has concerned whether firms reported
the gross value of their capital investment or the net value.
Recent work has tended to agree that some net measure of the
capital stock was being reflected in the figures. See Galiman
(1986) and Sokoloff (1984a).
28. If one computes the weighted—average growth in total factor
productivity from thefigures for 1820 and thefigures
for 1860, the estimates decline only slightly. NFP rises by 87 to
113 percent over the period, while TFP increases by 63 to 71
percent.91
29. One could, for example,explain the acceleration in total factor
productivity as arising from the expansion ofproduct markets,
which stimulated changes in theorganization of production within
the firm, technical change, and
intra—regional specialization
between the more urbanized counties
and the outlying areas within
the Northeast (Lindatrom,
1978; Sokoloff, 19841,).
30.Although itis difficult to imagine thatvariation in the
relativelysmallamount of tools and machineryper worker could
account for much of the largechanges observed in productivity, it
would be helpful to know,by industry, how the former ratio moved
over time. Unfortunately, of all thedata Bets being examined
here, only the 1832 sample contains
the detailed information on the
composition ofcapital necessary to estimate the ratio.It seems
likely, however that thepercentage changesin machinery and tools
per equivalent worker would resemble thecourse of the capital to
labor ratio, because the sharesof capital invested in tools and
machinery had not been altered muchby 1890 (Sokoloff, 1984a;
U. S. Census Office, 1895).
31. This Conjecture does
not necessarily hold, but if all elsewas
constant, one would expect it to. The chiefobstacles or
objections to its applicabilityprobably concern the variation
across industries in the rates at whichcapital goods depreciated,92
old vintages were replaced by new, and output increased over the
period. Thecomplicationarising from this latter gituation is
that the industries that grew most rapidly would tend to benefit
relatively more from technical change embodied in capital even if
their capital to labor ratios were low and hadnt changed much,
because a greater proportion of their capital stock would consist
of new—vintage items.
32. A series of pooled cross—section production functions were
estimated with various measures of output serving as the dependent
variable, and measures of the inputs, year dummies,industry
duixmiies,classduiies, and interactions appearing as independent
variables. When variables for the interaction between dummies for
the more mechanized or capital—intensive industries and the year
1860wereincluded in the specifications, the coefficients on them
generally failed to indicate that these classes of industries
realized significantly moreproductivitygrowth between 1820 and
1860.
33. For example, the per annumratesof growth of capital per
equivalent worker between 1820 and 1850 were 0.9—1.2 percent and
—0.l—+O.l percent for the more and less mechanized industries
respectively. During the next decade, the less mechanized
industries experienced a sharp acceleration in their absolute and
relative rates of increase of this variable to 4.0—6.8 percent per93
annum, as compared to the 0.7—2.3 percent pace registered by their
Counterparts.
34. If one decomposes the growth in value addedper equivalent worker,
the qualitative result is the same.Increasesin the capital to
labor ratio directly account for only a small fraction ofthe
progress realized, leaving most of the rise in labor productivity
to be explained by advances in total factor productivity.94
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